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Case No. 20100563-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER DUANE ELLIS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for possession or use of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2010), and purchase, transfer, possession or use 
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503(3)(b) (West 2004). This Court has 
jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
1. Whether the trial court correctly concluded that in conducting a 
Terry frisk the investigating officer justifiably found it necessary to remove all 
the contents of Defendant's pockets to adequately secure his safety? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Standard of Review. "The [appellate court] reviews the factual findings 
underlying a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress 
evidence under the clearly erroneous standard and review[s] the legal 
conclusions for correctness." State v. Marquez, 2007 UT App 170, f 6,163 P.3d 
687. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession or use of a controlled 
substance, (Count I), possession of drug paraphernalia (Count II), and the 
purchase, transfer, possession or use of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person (Count III). R5-4. Counts I and II were enhanced to a second degree 
felony and a class A misdemeanor, respectively, because they were 
committed in a drug-free zone. R32-31. 
Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized from him following a 
Terry frisk, arguing that the officer who conducted the search exceeded its 
2 
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proper scope by removing all of the items from Defendant's pocket, 
including non-weapons. R35-34. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court denied the motion. R38; 70-62; 103. The court explained that once the 
officer saw a knife sticking out of Defendant's pocket and then felt several 
sharp objects among other items within the bulging pocket, the officer could 
not safely remove the dangerous items without removing all of the pocket's 
contents. See R70-62 ("Ruling") at 66-65 (Addendum A). The court also 
ruled that drug paraphernalia, seized from Defendant's pocket and open to 
view, was not subject to suppression based on Defendant's consent to 
examine the object and under the plain view doctrine. R69. 
Defendant pleaded guilty to Count I, reduced to a third degree felony, 
and Count III, a Class A misdemeanor, conditioned on his right to appeal the 
denial of his suppression motion. R75, 84-77, 87-85; 104. 
The trial court sentenced Defendant to a zero-to-five-year term in the 
Utah State Prison for possession or use of a controlled substance (Count I) 
and to 365 days in jail for the purchase, transfer, possession or use of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person (Count III). R91-90. The court 
suspended both sentences and placed Defendant on 36-months probation, 
ordering that Defendant serve 210 days in jail. R91-90. 
3 
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Defense counsel failed to timely file a notice of appeal, contrary to 
Defendant's express wish. R94. The prosecutor stipulated that counsel had 
mistakenly neglected the appeal, and the trial court granted Defendant a 
reinstatement of time in which to file an appeal. R95-92. Defendant 
thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal. R98. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 17, 2009, Provo Police Officer David Moore responded to a 
citizen report of an auto burglary on University Avenue. R103:3-5. The 
dispatch provided a description of a suspect, who was reportedly trying to 
get into a car. Id. at 4-5. When the officer arrived at the scene, the citizen 
informants pointed out two suspects just up the street. Id. at 6. Officer 
Moore confirmed the description with the informants and drove up the 
street. Id. at 6-7. 
Upon approaching the suspects, Officer Moore had a distinct concern 
for his safety based on the nature of the reported offense. Id. at 7. As he 
approached the suspects, he assessed their physical presentation and looked 
at areas that might contain weapons. Id. One of the suspects was Defendant, 
and he had "very bulky pockets/' and "a clip knife in his right pocket/' 
which "concerned [the officer] greatly." Id. Officer Moore directed 
4 
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Defendant's companion to stand back and waited for backup to arrive. Id. at 
7-8. 
After Officer Daniel Smith arrived on the scene, Officer Moore directed 
Defendant to face away from him, spread his legs, and interlock his fingers. 
Id. at 8. Officer Moore immediately removed the folding-type knife sticking 
out of the right pocket and the clip and proceeded to check Defendant's waist 
band and front of both his pockets from the outside for weapons. Id. at 8-10. 
After frisking Defendant's waistband, Officer Moore "gently" touched 
the bulging right front pocket with the inside of his hand and felt numerous 
items. Id. at 7-8,11-12. "Sometimes people have needles, so I don't just start 
grabbing that area, I - -1 try to feel what's there to determine whether it feels 
like a needle, so I don't get stuck." Id. at 12. "But then I began [sic] to try to 
identify whether what's inside the pocket is a weapon or if it's just some 
benign piece of paper or something that's not a weapon." Id. 
Officer Moore felt "long objects that seemed to be sharp, but could not 
identify precisely what the sharp and pointy items actually were." Id. at 12, 
18. Believing that the objects could be knives or pens —which could also be 
weapons — the officer put his hand in the pocket to remove the items: 
I began to pull out what I felt that was, but there were so 
many items in the pocket that it was hard to, you know, pull 
5 
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out just that one thing; there were pouches and all kinds of 
stuff, so I just started taking everything out so I could sort 
through and determine what, you know, was dangerous and 
what wasn't. 
Id. at 12-13. He explained that he also removed the items in bulk out of 
concern for his own safety: 
I'm very careful about, if there's a lot of items in someone's 
pocket. I - -1 don't want to go start digging around with my 
fingertips, getting only those items that feel sharp if there's so 
much bulk there, because there could be razor blades there as 
well and so I just, rather than just try to take an individual item, if 
there's one item in a pocket that's a knife, certainly, that's easily - -
easy to identify that that's what it is, I could full that out; but when 
you have multiple items tliere, there could be shmys there. And so I 
try to grab outside of the bulk, take that out and set it up so I 
can determine what's there. 
Id. at 19 (emphasis added). 
Officer Moore removed everything in the right front pocket in two or 
three handfuls and handed them to Officer Smith, who placed the contents 
on a nearby window ledge. Id. Those contents included another folding 
knife, a three-inch knife sheath, pens, papers, and a couple of narrow 
pouches, which in Officer Moore's experience often contained weapons, 
such as razor blades, Leatherman tools, small pen knives —"things that have 
sharps on them." Id. at 13-15, 23, 25. 
Officer Moore also patted down Defendant's left front pocket and 
found it like the right pocket-"multiple items, items that felt pointy." Id. at 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15-17. Concerned for his safety, he also removed the contents as he had with 
the right pocket. Id. at 16-17. 
The knife sheath pulled from Defendant's right pocket particularly 
piqued Officer Smith's interest because he could see, without manipulating 
the sheath, a red straw and what appeared, from its outline, to be a 
methamphetamine pipe wrapped in very thin cloth in the sheath. Id. at "23-
24, 27-29. Officer Smith pointed this out to Officer Holt, the primary officer 
on the case. Id. at 22-23. Officer Holt asked Defendant what the wrapped 
object was, and Defendant admitted that it was drug paraphernalia. Id. at 24. 
Officer Holt then asked if he could look inside the sheath, and Defendant 
consented. Id. at 29. Inside the sheath was a glass methamphetamine pipe. 
Id. at 24. After discovering the pipe, the officers also found among the objects 
removed from Defendant's pockets a very small vial attached to a key chain. 
Id. at 31-33. The vial contained drugs. Id. at 32. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the officer exceeded the scope of a lawful 
protective Terry frisk when he intentionally seized items from his pockets 
which the officer did not suspect to be weapons. Defendant contends, 
instead, that the officer should have felt for only the sharp and pointy objects 
in Defendant's pocket and then removed only those objects. Terry does not 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
require such a meticulous procedure when, as in this case, the suspect's 
pockets are so tightly packed with items, felt to be both potentially 
dangerous and non-dangerous, that the officer cannot readily differentiate 
among them—especially when probing the contents presents a distinct risk 
of danger in itself. Defendant relies on cases that stand for the proposition 
that an officer conducting a Teriy frisk cannot indiscriminately remove items 
from a suspect's pocket when he knows or should know they are not 
weapons or he can readily distinguish a dangerous from a non-dangerous 
item. Those cases, however, do not describe the frisk and search in this case. 
Defendant further claims that the officers exploited the allegedly illegal 
protective search to obtain his consent to more closely view the 
paraphernalia and to gain access to the vial of drugs found in his pocket. The 
claim fails because it is founded exclusively on the unsubstantiated premise 
that the search of his pockets was illegal under Terry. 
8 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER PROPERLY CONDUCTED 
A TERRY FRISK OF DEFENDANT AND HE WAS THUS 
JUSTIFIED IN SEIZING THE CONTRABAND FOUND IN 
DEFENDANT'S POCKET WHEN HE REMOVED ALL THE 
CONTENTS OF DEFENDANT'S POCKETS 
Defendant does not dispute that the circumstances of his encounter 
with the police justified a protective frisk. See Aplt. Br. at 7-8. Rather, 
Defendant argues "Officer Moore exceeded the scope of a lawful protective 
frisk when he intentionally seized items from [his] pockets which Officer 
Moore did not suspect to be weapons/ ' Aplt. Br. at 8. In making this 
argument, Defendant relies on authorities condemning the indiscriminate 
seizure of non-dangerous items in situations in which officers unnecessarily 
went beyond the proper scope of a protective search. In this case, by 
contrast, the investigating officer had no easy, immediate means of removing 
only the dangerous objects from Defendant's pockets without also removing 
the mass of other objects, which the officer feared might also contain 
dangerous objects. Accordingly, the trial court correctly ruled the frisk to be 
within the proper scope of a protective search. 
9 
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A. When a person is reasonably believed to be armed and 
dangerous, an officer may conduct a protective frisk for the 
purpose of discovering weapons, including hidden instruments, * 
that may be used to assault the investigating officer. 
Officers may perform, without a warrant, a protective frisk of persons 
the officers reasonably suspect are armed and presently dangerous for the 
purpose of " discover[ing] . . . weapons [including 'hidden instruments'] 
which might be used to harm the officer or others nearby." Terry v. Ohio, 392 < 
U.S. 1, 23-24, 26, 29. Where it is conceded that the frisk was justified, the 
court must assess "whether [the action] was reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Id. at 20. 
"If the protective search goes beyond what is necessary to determine if the 
suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will be 
suppressed." Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993) (citing Sibron v. 
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66 (1968)). Upon detecting a dangerous weapon, the 
officer is authorized to take it from the suspect. See Teny, 392 U.S. at 29-30 
(upholding removal of gun from suspect after careful frisk indicated presence 
of weapons). As discussed below, Terry does not require an officer to extract 
only those items felt to be dangerous when they are contained within a 
crowded mass of objects which are difficult to distinguish and dangerous to 
manipulate. "Under Terry, the reasonableness of any warrantless search 
10 
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must be determined on a case-by-case basis with the focus on the totality of 
the circumstances." State v. Marquez, 2007 UT App 170, t i l , 163 R3d 687. 
B. The proceedings below. 
Officers were called to investigate an auto-burglary, see R103:3-7, a 
crime that Utah courts have agreed is one in which a suspicion of weapons 
arises. State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346, 37 P.3d 270, affd, 2003 UT 36, 78 
P.3d 590. Arriving at the scene, Officer Moore was immediately concerned 
for his safety. R103:7. He observed that Defendant was not alone, and he 
saw that both of Defendant's pockets were bulging and that a knife 
protruded from his right front pocket. Id. R. 103:7. Based on these facts and 
applicable law, the trial court noted that "Defendant [did] not challenge the 
validity of the initial stop nor the protective frisk/7 R70-67, at 66-67 (citing 
Marquez, 2007 UT App 170,114). 
Officer Moore deviated from his typically deliberate routine to 
immediately remove the knife protruding from Defendant's right pocket. 
R103:7-12. As soon as he began to frisk the right pocket, he found felt several 
11 
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sharp and pointy objects. Id. at 12.l Reaching in to remove these items, 
Officer Moore noticed that there were so many items in the pocket that it was 
both difficult and dangerous to slide his fingers around and in between 
objects to get a better feel for which of the individual items might actually be 
used as a weapon. R. 103:13-15,19. The officer particularly noted that while 
he might easily remove a single object, multiple sharp objects within a 
"bulk[y]" mass posed a much greater danger. Id. at 19. Thus, having felt 
numerous sharp and pointy objects, as well as pouches that in his experience 
had contained weapons —razor blades, pen knives— Officer Moore carefully 
placed his hand around the outside of the bulk and removed it in two or 
three handfuls. Id. 
On these facts, the trial court approved the manner of Officer Moore's 
seizure of the contents of Defendant's pockets. R69-65. The court ruled that 
"the officer was allowed to do what was necessary to secure his own safety 
and the safety of the public by removing [the sharp object] from Defendant's 
1
 Although the trial court referred to only a single sharp object, see R69, 
66, 65, the evidence was undiputed that Officer Moore felt numerous sharp 
and pointy objects — specifically "objects that seemed to be sharp"and 
"multiple items, items that felt pointy." R103:12-20. Defendant does not 
contend otherwise on appeal. Aplt. Br. at 6 (recognizing that "Officer Moore 
felt long objects that seemed to be sharp or pointy, which he believed could 
be weapons"). 
12 
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person/' R66. "In order to safely remove this sharp object/' the court 
concluded, "Officer Moore had to remove several items from the Defendant's 
pockets," a measure the court ruled to be "reasonable." Id. at 66-65. 
C The investigating officer was reasonably justified in removing all 
the contents in Defendant's pocket when he was unable to 
immediately distinguish only the dangerous items without risk to 
his safety. 
In reaching its conclusion, the trial court particularly relied on Shinault 
v. State, 668 N.E.2d 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). There, the court held that an 
officer conducting a Terry frisk was justified in removing an item from 
Shinault's pocket that turned out not to be a weapon, but a tightly rolled 
baggy of drugs. Id. at 278. The officer testified "that he did not know what 
[the baggy item] was; that he suspected it could be 'a bag of pot/ but also 
realized it could be 'a hundred different things.'" Id. Despite the fact that the 
officer did not know whether this was a weapon, the court found that 
because he "was unable to immediately eliminate the possibility that the 
tightly rolled plastic bag of marijuana was not some sort of dangerous 
weapon at the time of the seizure, [his] seizure of the marijuana was 
permissible under Terry/' Id. In other words, an officer does not offend Terry, 
if, uncertain about the nature of an object, he nevertheless reasonably 
believes the object might be a weapon and so removes it from the suspect's 
13 
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reach. Cf. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (referring to whether a frisk is initially 
justified, "[t]he officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is 
armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances 
would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in 
danger"). 
Still more relevant to the disposition of this case is Haynes v. State, 2008 
WL 1759086 (Alaska Ct. App.).2 In Haynes, the Alaska Court of Appeals 
addressed a Teny frisk very similar to this one. There, the defendant's 
" pocket was so full and stretched so tight that [the officer] was unable to tell 
exactly what was in the pocket/' and could not, therefore, determine whether 
it contained a weapon. Id. Because the officer was unable to tell what was in 
Haynes's pocket, he reached into the pocket and removed its contents, all of 
which were "intertwined." Id. One of the items was a clear plastic bag 
containing a white powdery substance that appeared to be cocaine. The 
discovery of this white powder led the troopers to open the other containers 
from Haynes's pocket, thus uncovering the crack cocaine. Id. 
2
 Haynes is an unpublished opinion. Id. at *1. Therefore, while not 
binding authority, its conclusion as the disposition of a three-judge appellate 
panel is relevant. 
14 
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The court held that it was reasonable to pull out the entire mass of 
items together where the officer could not have reasonably identified the 
contents of the pocket without removing the entire mass. Id. at *2. See also 
State v. Heitzmann, 632 N.W.2d 1, 8 (N.D. 2001) (where officer patted 
defendant's jacket pockets, "he noticed a 'bunch of stuff in the pockets" but 
"was unable to tell if there was a weapon in the pockets," and thus "acted 
reasonably in asking Heitzmann to remove the contents of the jacket pockets 
and place them on the hood of [the] pickup"); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE O N THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 9.6(d) (2010) 
(recognizing as "unrealistic" requirement that officer re-evaluate mistaken 
perception of weapon while seizing item from pocket, which would 
constitute "'fine tuning' of Fourth Amendment requirements without any 
appreciable gain" and noting "it will usually be impracticable for the officer 
to withdraw the suspected item from the pocket without pulling out other 
objects as well"). 
Shinault and Haynes are dispositive of this case. The trial court 
correctly concluded that the bulky mass Officer Moore found in Defendant's 
pockets, within which the officer felt sharp and pointy objects and which 
indisputably contained a knife, was too great for the officer to manipulate 
15 
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without further endangering himself. R66. In sum, the officer was justified 
in removing the entire mass. Id. 
Defendant nevertheless contends that the trial court should not have 
acquiesced in Officer Moore's removing all the contents of his pockets, but 
ruled instead that the officer was required to feel for only the sharp and 
pointy objects within Defendant's pocket and then remove only those 
objects. Aplt. Br. at 11-14. Removing all the contents of Defendant's pockets 
without first sorting through them, he argues, was unauthorized under Terry: 
Id. 
In support, Defendant likens the frisk in this case to that in United 
States v. Campa, 234 F.3d 733 (1st Cir. 2000). Aplt. Br. at 9. There, officers 
confronted Campa, following a tip that he was distributing counterfeit alien 
work permits. Id. at 735. The officers conducted a pat-down search, during 
which they removed Campa's wallet, keys, and a beeper, acknowledging that 
they "made no attempt to distinguish between bulging items that could be 
weapons and other types of concealed objects." Id. at 736, 739. The First 
Circuit held that this "indiscriminate removal of items embraced objects that 
were readily identifiable as non-weapons . . . was unnecessary and 
unlawful." Id. at 739. 
16 
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Defendant also relies on State v. Fowler, 883 P.2d 338 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1994). An officer stopped a car, in which Fowler was a passenger, for 
speeding and weaving. Id. at 338. After Fowler was observed making furtive 
movements towards the floor, another officer frisked him, detected a hard 
object and two soft objects in his jacket pocket, and removed all three objects. 
Id. at 339. The soft objects contained LSD. Id. At the suppression hearing, 
the officer testified that he knew the soft objects were not weapons when he 
reached into Fowler's pocket and that he was not specifically trying to 
withdraw those objects. Id. Rather, he reached in and grasped everything he 
could in an effort to withdraw the hard object. Id. 
The trial court found that the pocket from which the LSD was removed 
was "large [and] roomy/7 and the officer knew the soft packages were not 
weapons. Id. at 340. It ruled, and the court of appeals agreed, that the frisk 
was unjustified under Terry "because the trooper had the time and ability to 
differentiate between the hard object, which might have been a weapon, and 
the soft ones which clearly were not." Id. at 339-40. 
While Campa and Fowler were arguably correctly decided under their 
facts, they provide guidance only by distinction from this case. Both cases 
stand for the reasonable proposition that an officer conducting a Terry frisk 
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cannot indiscriminately remove items from a suspect's pocket when he 
knows or should know they are not weapons or he can readily distinguish a 
dangerous from a non-dangerous item. As discussed, those are not the 
circumstances in this case. 
Here, Officer Moore reasonably believed that some of the items he felt 
might be dangerous weapons. He was, however, unable to distinguish those 
potentially dangerous items within the massive bulk within the pocket. 
Further, he was not even sure that the bulky mass, apart from those items he 
perceived to be sharp and pointy, did not contain dangerous items, based on 
his past experience. And finally, he articulated a reason for circumspectly 
removing the entire contents of Defendant's pockets, untreated by any of 
Defendant's authorities: to rummage about in Defendant's pockets presented 
a threat to his safety, not because some objects might contain a weapon that 
Defendant might use against him, but because the mere search for such an 
object presented a threat to his safety, also based on his experience. In short, 
Defendant has cited no authority to show that on the facts of this case Officer 
Moore's search of his pockets was invalid. 
And Fowler has twice been distinguished on facts like those in this case. 
In State v. Rubio, 139 Wash.App. 1069 (2007), the Washington Court of 
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Appeals held an officer's actions to be reasonable when the officer reached 
into the defendant's pocket and pulled out all of the items. 2007 WL 2085348 
(Unpublished). The court noted that there was not "ample time and 
opportunity to extract the hard objects without disturbing the soft baggie." 
Id. at *2. Further, "[t]here was no evidence that [defendant's] pocket was so 
large and roomy that [the officer] could have readily separated the baggie 
fom the hard items." Id. In State v. Barboza, 158 Wash.App. 1034 (2010), the 
same court held that although an officer did not distinguish between the 
items when reaching in to remove them, he "did not know that he was 
seizing anything that was not a weapon until after he already pulled it out. 
Thus, [the officer's] removal of the entire contents of [the defendant's] pocket, 
which included . . . baggies containing methamphetamine, did not exceed the 
permissible scope of a Terry frisk." 2010 WL 4514196 (Wash. App.) 
(Unpublished). 
Finally, Defendant's claim flies in the face of the Fourth Amendment's 
underlying directive: "The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth 
Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the 
particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.'" 
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106,108-09 (1977) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 
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19). It is one thing to require an officer to remove only a knife from a pocket 
when he can readily distinguish it from one or a few soft objects. But it would 
be unreasonable and illogical to demand that an officer jeopardize his own 
safety by blindly probing through a stuffed pocket to feel out sharp items 
and then attempt to extract them one by one, especially when officer safety is 
the concern that justified the search in the first place. And regardless of 
safety, it is quite likely that if the pocket is stuffed with all sorts of items, it 
may not reasonably be possible for an officer to successfully perform such a 
task. 
Further, requiring an officer to feel around inside a defendant's pants 
pockets full of items to dig out only those that feel dangerous is perhaps 
much more intrusive than retrieving the entire bulk of the packed items 
together. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25 (recognizing that "[e]ven a limited 
search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a severe, though brief, 
intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an 
annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience"). Rather, the 
outcome that is most reasonable and which is most consistent with the safety 
goals that justify Tern/ frisks in the first place is one that views'a bulk of 
sharp items stuffed together in a pocket as one. Thus, where an officer can 
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feel that that bulk of items contains sharp and pointy objects, the officer is 
especially justified in removing the bulk en masse, not only because the 
dangerous weapons have been detected, but also because manipulation of 
the mass presents a further threat to the officer's safety. 
D. Because the Terry frisk was reasonable, the seizure of the 
contraband incidentally discovered in the frisk was likewise 
reasonable. 
Defendant claims that Officer Holt, who assisted Officer Moore in the 
search of his pockets, exploited the allegedly illegal search to obtain 
Defendant's consent to search the sheath containing the methamphetamine 
pipe. Aplt. Br. at 14-17 (citing State v. Hansen, 2002 UT125, 63 P.3d 650). The 
claim fails because it is founded exclusively on the unsubstantiated premise 
that Officer Moore's search of Defendant's pockets was illegal under Terry. 
Id. 
The State acknowledges that a voluntary consent to search is not valid 
if it was "'obtained by police exploitation of [a] prior illegality.'" Hansen, 
2002 UT 125, f 47 (quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1262 (Utah 1993)). 
Defendant identifies the frisk as the prior illegality. Aplt. Br. at 16. But as 
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{ 
explained above, the frisk was lawful, and thus, there was no "prior 
illegality/' Accordingly, Defendant's exploitation claim lacks merit.3 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of July, 2011. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONST 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
3
 In a footnote, Defendant claims that the discovery of the drugs in the 
vial was also obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegal frisk. See 
Aplt. Br. at 17 n.l. That claim fails for the same reason. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER DUANE ELLIS, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Date: February 1,2010 
Case No.: 091402191 
Judge: David N. Mortensen 
This matter comes before the court on Defendant's Motion To Suppress ("Defendant's 
Motion"). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 17, 2009, Provo City Police Officer David Moore responded to a citizen-reported 
vehicle burglary in the area of 200 North and University Avenue Provo, Utah. At the scene, the 
informant identified Defendant as the perpetrator. As Officer Moore approached Defendant, he 
noticed the handle of a knife and the clip of a knife sheath protruding from Defendant's pants 
pocket. He also noticed that Defendant's pockets were bulging. Officer Daniel Smith and Officer 
Holt arrived at the scene and assisted Officer Moore in removing the knife from Defendant's 
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person. Officer Moore initiated a Terry frisk to look for additional weapons. As part of the frisk, 
Officer Moore "squeezed" the waist band and front pocket areas of the Defendant. While 
squeezing the front right pocket, Officer Moore felt a long, sharp object. Officer Moore testified 
that he thought this object might be a weapon. Because Defendant's pockets were so full and 
because Officer Moore was worried about being injured by the sharp object, he pulled all of the 
items out of Defendant's pocket before sifting through them to find the object. Officer Moore 
gave these items to Officer Smith who put them on the ledge of a nearby window sill. Among the 
items Officer Smith noticed a Leatherman knife and a black knife sheath containing a red straw 
and an item shaped like a meth pipe wrapped in a thin cloth. The items in the sheath were open to 
view. Officer Smith showed the sheath to Officer Holt. Seeing that the knife sheath contained an 
item in the shape of a meth pipe, an officer asked the defendant what it was. Defendant responded 
that it wras drug paraphernalia. 
One of the officers then asked the Defendant if he could look inside the sheath. Defendant 
consented. Officer Holt discovered a meth pipe. After confirming that the knife sheath contained 
paraphernalia the officers searched other items taken out of Defendant's pocket, which included a 
small silver vial with a screw-off lid attached to a key chain. One of the officers opened the vial 
and found that it contained a white crystalline substance. 
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
The exclusionary rule bars admission of evidence at trial that is the product of an illegal 
search. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 45 (1963) Under the Fourth Amendment, 
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searches of an individual's person are only legal where reasonable, and generally, for a search to 
be reasonable it must be authorized by a warrant. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). A 
protective frisk, or Terry search, is a narrow exception to the presumption that a warrantless 
search is unreasonable. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 421 (1997). A Terry search requires 
that an officer reasonably believes the person to be searched is (1) involved in a crime, (2) is 
armed, and (3) is presently dangerous to the officer, the public, or the person to be searched. State 
v. Naranjo, 2005 UT App 311, f 15. Additionally, "[a] search for weapons in the absence of 
probable cause to arrest...must like any other search, be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies 
which justify its initiation." Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26. 
"When a lawful frisk indicates a suspicious object, the officer at risk is justified in making 
further inquiries to ascertain whether the subject of the frisk is armed." State v. Marquez, 2007 
UT App 170, \ 14. This "further inquiry" is limited to a search for weapons and not a search for 
further evidence, such as contraband. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993). See 
also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40(1968) ("If the protective search goes beyond what is 
necessary to determine if the suspect is armed, it is no longer valid under Terry and its fruits will 
be suppressed.") In Minnesota v. Dickerson, the Court held that contraband found during a Terry 
frisk must be suppressed where the officer removed the item from Defendant's pocket even 
though he did not suspect that it was a weapon. The officer determined it was contraband after 
"'squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant's pocket'-a pocket 
which the officer already knew contained no weapon." 508 U.S. at 378. The Court also found that 
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the plain-view doctrine applies to touch as long as the purpose of the search is to look for 
weapons. Id. at 377. Under the "plain view" doctrine, police may seize an object within plain 
view if its incriminating character is immediately apparent and the officers have lawful right of 
access to the object. Id. at 375. 
Defendant does not challenge the validity of the initial stop nor the protective frisk. 
Rather, he challenges the legality of the officer's action of manipulating, or "squeezing", the 
contents of his pockets and emptying his pockets of their contents. Defendant claims that the 
search conducted by Officer Moore went beyond a Terry search and that Officer Moore's 
justification-that the Defendant's pockets were bulging and that there was a sharp object in one of 
them-did not provide a reasonable basis for intrusion beyond a simple pat down. Therefore, the 
fruits of the search should be suppressed. He also contends that because the search was unlawful 
his consent was unlawfully acquired cannot validate discovery of the paraphernalia and drugs. 
Suppression is not warranted in this case. Officer Moore conducted a valid Terry search. 
It was reasonable to believe that Defendant was involved in a crime since he received a credible 
report from a reliable citizen-informant. Because Officer Moore had already removed a 
dangerous weapon from the Defendant's pocket, a weapon that was in plain view, it was 
reasonable to believe that Defendant might have access to additional weapons. It was also 
reasonable to believe that Defendant was presently dangerous since he had allegedly been 
allegedly engaging in criminal activW, had been carrying a knife, and had free access to bulging 
pockets. The reasonableness of these actions is further corroborated by the fact that the Defendant 
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did, in fact, have another object on his person that could act as a weapon, namely, a Leatherman 
knife. 
While Officer Moore admitted to squeezing the items in Defendant's pockets, his search 
was "strictly circumscribed" to a search for weapons. This is the distinction between the instant 
case and Dickerson. The officer in that case initiated a more intrusive search when he felt an item 
that he thought may be contraband. He made no claim, and would not have had a reasonable 
claim, that he suspected Dickerson possessed a weapon. The Court made it clear that, had the 
officer shown a reasonable suspicion that Dickerson possessed a weapon or had the incriminating 
character of the evidence been immediately apparent the evidence would not have been 
suppressed. Id. at 374-378. Squeezing and manipulating a Defendant's pockets does not, in itself, 
invalidate a Terry search. Requiring an officer to make a flat-handed search was never mandated 
by Terry or Dickerson, so long as the officer has reason to believe the person searched is carrying 
a weapon. In fact, making such a requirement would undermine the purpose of Terry-to secure 
the safety of officers and the public. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24. 
Removing the materials from Defendant's pockets was also reasonable under the 
circumstances. While conducting the Terry search Officer Moore came across a sharp object, 
suggesting that the Defendant had an additional weapon on his person. Therefore, the point of 
danger had not yet passed, and the officer was allowed to do what was necessary to secure his own 
safety and the safety of the public by removing this item from Defendant' s person. In order to 
safely remove this sharp object, Officer Moore had to remove several items from the Defendant's 
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pockets. The court finds that this was a reasonable measure. 
This case is factually similar to Shinault v. State where an officer felt a cylindrical bulge 
during the course of a valid Terry search. 668 N.E.2d 274 (Indiana Ct. App. 1996). The officer 
suspected it to be "bag of pot", but thought there was a possibility of it being a dangerous weapon. 
He removed the object from the defendant's pocket and discovered that it was marijuana. Id at 
278. The court held that because the officer was unable to immediately eliminate the possibility 
that the tightly rolled plastic bag containing drugs was a weapon the officer's seizure of the drugs 
was permissible under Terry. Id 
Here, not only was Officer Moore unable to eliminate the possibility of a weapon being on 
the Defendant's person, but he had strong evidence that Defendant carried a weapon. He had 
already removed a knife from the Defendant's pocket and he felt a long, sharp object, an object he 
reasonably suspected to be another knife. Specifically, the officer thought the Defendant had an 
additional weapon as opposed to contraband. Once the defendant acknowledged the presence of 
drug paraphernalia, the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant. Up to this point, all 
the officers' activities were connected with clearing the defendant of weapons, one of which they 
had already found, and soon a second knife was found as well as the knife sheath where the meth 
pipe wras located. 
The officers were justified in seizing the drug paraphernalia removed from Defendant's 
pocket under the "plain view" doctrine and by the Defendant's consent. In this case the officers 
were authorized to seize the drug paraphernalia located in the knife sheath taken from Defendant's 
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pocket because the paraphernalia was in plain view, its incriminating character was immediately 
apparent, and, as discussed above, officers had a lawful right of access to the object. Furthermore, 
the officers obtained consent from the Defendant to remove the items from the knife sheath. 
Because removal of the items from Defendant's pockets were lawful under Teriy and the consent 
was voluntarily given, the seizure of the paraphernalia was lawful- See State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 
650, TJ 62 (Utah 2002). See also AM. JUR. Searches and Seizures § 71 (1st ed. 2010). 
The evidence of drug paraphernalia need not be suppressed because it was lawfully 
obtained. Officer Moore effectuated a valid Terry search because he reasonably believed the 
Defendant was engaged in criminal activity, was armed, and was presently dangerous. Squeezing 
Defendant's pockets was lawful because Officer Moore reasonably believed that the Defendant 
carried a weapon and could tell that additional items were in his pockets, one of which he 
suspected was a knife. Emptying Defendant's pockets was lawful because the frisk uncovered a 
suspicious object and the only way to safely identify that object was to empty the contents of 
Defendant's pockets. The paraphernalia was lawfully seized under the plain view doctrine or by 
the Defendant's consent. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, this court hereby denies Defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
Dated this 1st day of February, 2010.
 v>, .._ 
Judge David N. Mortensen *^^fe$ 
Fourth Judicial District Courtp^:\^^il 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
Page 8 of 8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 091402191 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
FAX: STATE OF UTAH -~ : *' 
FAX: DEFENDER PUBLIC (801)852-1078 -
 v 
Date: £rf~/Q Ky^/r7lJ/LL ' ^ ? 
Deputy Court" Clerk . . // 
Page 1 (last) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
